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A recent Federal Trade Commission report found 87% to 97% of
Internet Web sites collected personal information from those who accessed
those sites,' but very few had any policy concerning disclosure of the
information collected.2 Intel's new Pentium III chip, which contains a
Processor Serial Number capable of disclosing a browser's identification,
will ease the ability of Internet providers to compile information regarding
users and may enable tracking of a browser's activity.3 Even users of
* This note is dedicated to James Kodilla for teaching me the importance of constitutional
protection and encouraging my study of law. This note received the Barbara W. Makar writing
award for Fall 1999.
i. See FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 23 (June,
1998) <http://www.ftc.gov/reportsprivacy3/priv-23a.pdf>.
2. See id at 27.
3. See Complaint and Req. for Inj., CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY &TECHNOLOGY, 1-2 (Feb.

26, 1999) <http://www.cdt.org/privacy/intelcomplaint.shtml>. The Pentium III chip is not the first
to raise concerns about computer privacy. See Wyman P. Berryessa, EscrowedEncryptionSystems:
CurrentPublicPolicy May Destroy Valued ConstitutionalProtections,23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59,
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closed networks are subject to scrutiny. The National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health found twenty-six million workers were
subject to computer surveillance.4 Not surprisingly, members of Congress
and privacy groups have called for legislation to protect activity on a
computer network from unwarranted monitoring.' Nevertheless, federal
law lacks comprehensive protection. Courts have been left to rely on
common law interpretation of the Fourth Amendment6 and interpretation
of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as
amended by The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986;
collectively referred to as The Federal Wiretap Statute. 7
The malleability of the Fourth Amendment and the limitations of the
federal wiretap statute have led to inconsistent results regarding similar
claims. The lack of comprehensive law also has resulted in technologically
driven outcomes to legal disputes. Thus, as computer technology improves
the ability to monitor other users' activity, the privacy that courts award
those users diminishes. This decrease in privacy has favorable results when
monitoring leads to locating and prosecuting criminal activity, but has
potentially detrimental effects when monitoring leads to divulgence of an.
innocent user's private communications.
This Note explores the current state of federal law applicable to
computer communication privacy Part I discusses the application of the
Fourth Amendment to computer privacy concerns. Part II explores the
federal wiretap statute and its limitations. Part III concludes with a
discussion of how legislation may enhance computer privacy.

68 (1997). The Clipper Chip, which the government designed to protect computer privacy by
encrypting communications, was abandoned following a storm of protest. See id. at 67-68. The
public rejected the Chip because it was designed to enable the government to monitor
communications to and from a computer in which the Chip was installed by a mechanism called the
Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF). See id. at 67. Civil rights and privacy groups worried that
the government would require all computers to be manufactured with a Clipper Chip, resulting in
unprecedented government monitoring of personal communications. See id. at 67-68.
4. See 139 CoNG. REc. S6122 (daily ed. May 19, 1993) (statement of Sen. Simon).
5. See id; 139.CONG. REC. E1077-78 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Williams); Electronic Privacy Information Center, Protect Your PC's Privacy (visited Feb. 27,
1999) <http://www.bigbrotherinside.com>.
6. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " Id.
7. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1998).
8. For information regarding state privacy law, see Kevin J. Baum, E-Mail in the Workplace
and the Right of Privacy, 42 VILL. L. REV. l 01ll, 1018-21 (1997); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky,
Prying,Spying and Lying: Intrusive Newsgatheringand What the Law Should Do About It, 73 TUL.
L. REV. 173, 193-216 (1998) (discussing common law privacy claims).

PRIVACY AND THE INTERNET

I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable
searches and seizures.9 The extent of the Amendment's protection has
changed as American society's values have evolved. Whether technology
alters society's values and thereby alters Fourth Amendment protection is
not clear.'°
A. TraditionalAnalysis
In Katz v. UnitedStates," the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the government's eavesdropping and recording of a criminal
defendant's conversations from a telephone booth violated any right to
privacy the defendant possessed with regard to those conversations. 2 The
Court found the defendant did have a right to private telephone
conversations and the government violated his right.13 According to the
Court the wiretap was, in effect, a search and seizure subject to the

9, See U.S. CONST. amend IV.
10. See Frederick Schauer, Internet Privacy and the Public-Private Distinction, 38
JURIMETRIcs J.555, 562-63 (1998) (arguing that notions of privacy change as technology changes
because technology changes our expectations). The prospect of technology eradicating current
notions of privacy as technology enables greater access to information has caused concern which
some courts are beginning to discuss. See, e.g., United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247, 1254
(10th Cir. 1996) (McKay, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (discussing the Fourth
Amendment problems which the use of thermal imaging to conduct a search has raised):
[I]f we permit information obtained by thermal imaging to be considered waste,
abandoned, or to be characterized as having some other non-protected legal status,
then we not only permit unwarranted invasions by the police but analytically
destroy civil remedies against privacy invaders such as the paparazzi and tabloid
photographers. Our failure to draw the line at this first and primitive warrantless
invasion would make it particularly difficult to protect against the use of "passive"
devises of the future that would invade the privacy of our chambers or that would
re-create the full range of the activities in our homes by way of computer-assisted
images broadcast at the station house, at the newsroom of the local press or
television station, or on the Internet. This modest parade of the horribles is not
fanciful: Any user of the Internet or follower of the news media is aware of the
fact thatthe Brave New World is at hand.
Id.; see also Wesley v. WISN Div., 806 F. Supp. 812, 814 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (rejecting the plaintiff's
privacy claim, but noting, "we do not have to assume that as soon as we leave our homes we enter
an Orwellian world of ubiquitous hidden microphones").
11. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
12. See id. at 348-49.
13. See id at 352-53.
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restrictions of the Fourth Amendment. 4 The Court held the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
protected a person's privacy where that person had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. 5 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion introduced
the two-fold test later used to determine when a reasonable expectation of
privacy existed: First, did the person have a subjective expectation of
privacy; and, second, was that expectation objectively reasonable? 6
Where a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, government7
intrusion constituted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.1
A search and seizure triggered the Fourth Amendment requirement that the
search be "reasonable."' 8 (If the search was not reasonable, the evidence
obtained from the search was excluded under the Fourth Amendment.) 9
Reasonableness, in turn, required probable cause as expressed in a warrant,
or circumstances permitting an exception to the warrant, prior to a
government search.2" Katz held that a reasonable expectation of privacy did
not attach to that which a person knew was susceptible to public
exposure." As a result, an examination of anything to which a defendant
could not attach a reasonable expectation of privacy did not offend the
Constitution because it did not constitute an unreasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment. 2
In O'Connorv. Ortega,23 the United States Supreme Court applied Katz
to determine the extent of privacy an employee reasonably could expect. 4
In that case, a state employer conducted a search of an employee's office
as part of an investigation of alleged employee misconduct.25 The Court

14. See id.at 353.
15. Seeid. at 351-52.

16. See id.at 361. Subsequent use of the reasonable expectation test occurred in: O'Connor
v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); United

States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
17. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
18. See Michelle Skatoff-Gee, Changing Technologies and the Expectation of Privacy: A

Modern Dilemma, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 189, 191 (1996).
19. See id.
20. See id.at 191 n.18.
21. See Katz, 389 U.S at 351.
22. See Skatoff-Gee, supra note 18, at 191.
23. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
24. See O'Connor,480 U.S. at 718.

25. See id. at 712-13. The Fourth Amendment applied to the employer because the employer
was a state hospital and, therefore, a government entity subject to the limitations of the Fourth
Amendment as applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 714. The Court
noted, "The strictures of the Fourth Amendment, applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, have been applied to the conduct of governmental officials in various civil activities."
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distinguished those areas and materials to which many people had access
from the employee's office, where only the employee's invitees may have
had access, and where the employee retained materials that were unrelated
to the employer's business.26 The Court held that materials the employee
retained in his office which he did not share with other employees or the
employer were private. 27 As a result, the employer was not entitled to
examine those materials and violated the Fourth Amendment when it did
so. 2' The Court included the employee's personal correspondence in the
materials to which the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy.29
The Katz analysis worked well in those cases where society established
agreed upon parameters. Such parameters distinguished, for example, an
employee bulletin board which was not private, even if private material
was posted on it, from an employee's handbag, the contents of which
remained private.30 Where society has not established agreed upon
parameters, as in cyberspace, the Katz analysis lacks consistent
application."
B. Katz in Cyberspace
Cyberspace presents privacy problems because it is accessible by many.
Since anyone can log onto the World Wide Web, an expectation of privacy
on the Web is not reasonable. On the other hand, where a network is
limited to specified users, or one is sending a message to a discrete
address, an expectation of privacy may be reasonable.
In UnitedStates v. Simons,32 a government employer discovered that an
employee was using his computer at work to access the Internet and
download pornography. 3 The employer made the discovery after the
network manager (who claimed merely to be checking system capabilities
at the time) checked logs of Internet connections and used the keyword
'"sex" to find inappropriate connections made to the Internet.34 Using the
Katz analysis as employed in O'Connor, the district court interpreted
O 'Connorto require reasonableness when an employer conducted a search

26. See id. at 718.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 719.
29. See id. at 718.
30. See id, at 716.
31. See Note, Keeping Secrets in Cyberspace: EstablishingFourth Amendment Protection
for Internet Communication, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1591, 1599 (1997). "Because the architecture of
cyberspace is dissimilar to most conventional notions of place, analogizing cyberspace to a place
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment has serious limitations." Id.
32. 29 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Va. 1998).
33. See id. at 326.
34. See id. at 325-26.
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rather than probable cause as required in a law enforcement search." The
court found that the employer's searches of the employee's hard drive,
initially from a remote computer, were reasonable since the employer had
reason to suspect the employee was engaging in misconduct.36 The court
found that the remoteness of the initial search indicated the search was
reasonable in light of O'Connor "because there was no entry into
Defendant's office."37 Thus, under the Simons analysis, surveillance of
employees by computer creates no Fourth Amendment violation.
The Simons court found the initial search of the employee's computer
was valid under the O'Connorreasonableness standard. 3' As a result, the
court held the evidence obtained thereby was admissible in a subsequent
criminal proceeding against the employee.3 ' The court rejected the
employee's contention that evidence obtained from searches conducted
without a warrant was inadmissible in the criminal case because: 1)the
employer and its investigators conducted the search; 2) the employer had
a policy of monitoring computer activity; and 3) the employee could not
objectively expect privacy when engaging in activity over the Internet.4 °
Under different circumstances, courts have upheld employee privacy on
the Internet. In McVeigh v. Cohen,4 ' the district court granted an
employee's motion for an injunction to remain in the United States Navy
pending litigation of his privacy claim. 42 A Navy volunteer who subscribed
to America Online (AOL) deciphered from an e-mail she received (from
a user named "boysrch") and AOL's member profile directory that the
sender was enlisted in the military and was homosexual.43 The Navy then
contacted AOL to obtain information linking the e-mail and profile to
McVeigh, who was enlisted in the Navy." The Navy began proceedings to
discharge McVeigh for violating the "don't ask, don't tell" policy because
his AOL profile referred to his homosexuality.45
The court concluded that the Navy violated McVeigh's privacy and
engaged in illegal discovery when it obtained information from AOL
without a warrant.4 6 Rather than considering anything placed on the

35. See id. at 327.
36. See id.
at 328.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 325, 328.
40. See id.- at 327-28.
41. 983 F. Supp. 215 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
42. See id. at 216.
43. See id. at 217.
44. See id.
45. See id. The court's opinion was based upon its disagreement with the military's "don't
ask, don't tell" policy. See id. at 221.
46. See id at 219-20. The warrant requirement arose under 18 U.S.C. § 2703 of the
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Internet to be public and therefore not subject to an objective expectation
of privacy, the court held McVeigh's e-mail signed "boysrch" was private
and anonymous.47 The court railed against the Navy for conducting what
it considered
an unreasonable investigation into an enlisted man's private
48
life.
In another military case, United States v. Maxwell,49 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that a reasonable expectation
of privacy existed where Maxwell, an AOL subscriber, used different
passwords and screen names to remain anonymous.5 0 The Air Force courtmartialed the defendant after the FBI learned he had transmitted indecent
e-mail." The court agreed with Maxwell that AOL violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by divulging his Internet activity to the FBI." The court
concluded that the content of Maxwell's e-mail and the fact that it was
transmitted by a privately owned network (AOL) indicated he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 3
Unlike Simons, McVeigh and Maxwell were off duty when they used
their computers to engage in the communications at issue.54 The different
contexts in which the claims in Simons, McVeigh, and Maxwell arose
indicate that employees' constitutional privacy to computer
communications depends upon a variety of factors such as when and where

Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986 discussed below. See id.
47. See id. at 219.
48. See id.
The court noted that statements posted on the Internet often lack reliability since
cyberspace "invites fantasy and affords anonymity .... Id. When referring to the Navy's failure
to comply with the warrant requirement of the ECPA, the court said in dicta, "In these days of 'big
brother,' where through technology and otherwise the privacy interests of individuals from all walks
of life are being ignored or marginalized, it is imperative that statutes explicitly protecting these
rights be strictly observed." Id. at 220.
49. 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
50. See id. at 417.
51. See id. at 410,414. The defendant sent the offensive e-mail from his private computer at
home. See id.
at 411.
52. See id. at 422-23. Although the FBI issued a warrant, AOL divulged to the government
information that it had compiled independent of the warrant, not pursuant to the warrant. See id.
at 421.
53. See id. at 417. The court compared e-mail to a telephone call and said:
[T]he maker of a telephone call has a reasonable expectation that police officials
will not intercept and listen to the conversation ....
Drawing from these parallels,
we can say that the transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a reasonable
expectation that police officials will not intercept the transmission without
probable cause and a search warrant.
Id. at 418 (citations omitted). The Maxwell court also rejected the idea that e-mail files were subject
to plain view because they had to be opened prior to seeing the contents. See id. at 422.
54. See McVeigh, 983 F. Supp. at 219; Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 41!.
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employees access the Internet, what steps employees take to hide their
identities, and the reasonableness of the actions their employers take to
discover their identities. Mc Veigh and Maxwell are rare, however, in the
broad protection they afforded the employee. More often, courts have held
the nature of computer technology destroys privacy expectations.
C. TechnologicalAnalysis
Katz noted that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."
Nevertheless, courts have entertained a place-oriented approach in
concluding that cyberspace is a place where no privacy exists.56 Where
bulletin boards are at issue, the privacy analysis involves a simple analogy
of computer bulletin boards with traditional bulletin boards posted in
public places." As a result, courts have upheld searches against Fourth
Amendment privacy claims where law enforcement searched computer
bulletin boards for illegal activity.5
Courts also have treated chat rooms as public places which do not
provide an objective expectation of privacy. 9 In United States v.
Charbonneau,6' the court upheld a search conducted after Florida
Department of Law Enforcement officers monitored and recorded
conversations that took place in an AOL chat room which indicated users
were trading child pornography. 6 ' The officers traced the defendant (who
was supplying the chat room users pornography) to Ohio where they
conducted a search of his home.62 The court summarily rejected the
defendant's claim of privacy in the chat room.63
While it may seem obvious that bulletin boards and chat rooms are
sufficiently public that a reasonable person could not entertain expectations
of privacy, where the privacy of e-mail is at stake, the determination of
what is public and what is private becomes difficult. In Charbonneau,for

55. See Katz, 389 U.S. 351.
56. See United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1185 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Sega
Enter. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 930 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
57. See, e.g., Sega, 948 F. Supp. at 927-30,939 (holding a bulletin board operator was liable
for copyright and trademark infringement after posting pirated Sega software for downloading). The
Sega court noted that the bulletin board was open to the public and, therefore, the bulletin board
operator could not claim information stored on it was private. See id. at.927, 930.
58. See Davis v. Gracey, I ll F.3d 1472, 1478-79 (10th Cir. 1997) (rejecting defendant's
privacy claim to seized computer equipment because the defendant used the equipment to post
pornographic material on a bulletin board).
59. See Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1185.
60. 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
61. See id. at 1179, 1184.
62. See id. at 1179.
63. See id at 1184. The court merely stated, "Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy while using AOL." Id.
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example, the court struggled with the Fourth Amendment analysis as
applied to e-mail.64 The defendant had sent the pornographic material at
issue via e-mail.65 The court allowed the place to determine the extent of
privacy.66
Although the court noted that e-mail was the equivalent of posted mail,
it held that mail sent by computer diminished the sender's Fourth
Amendment rights "incrementally., 67 The court distinguished mail sent
from mail received. 6 It held that once transmission of e-mail took place,
all privacy attached to it vanished, and users of the Internet transmitted email at the risk of law enforcement intercepting and using the e-mail
against the sender. 69 The court's analysis hinged upon the defendant's use
of a chat room to send mail.70 To support its analysis, the court looked to
Hoffa v. United States,7' where the Court held statements overheard by an
undercover agent were not private.72 In other words, e-mail seen by
government agents was akin to overhearing a conversation.73
E-mail seized incidental to computer seizure also lacks protection. The
courts have allowed technology to form the analysis where e-mail is not a
part of the crime but incidental to it. In Davisv. Gracey,4 for example, law
enforcement officers seized computer equipment used to transmit obscene
CD-ROM images via a bulletin board.75 Private subscribers used the
bulletin board to communicate.76 The officers seized a computer that
contained 150,000 e-mail messages which subscribers had posted but
which had not been read by the addressees." The defendant alleged the email was the private correspondence of the bulletin board users and not
subject to the search. 7' The defendant also noted that there was no probable

64. See id.
65. See id. at 1179.
66. See id.
at 184.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 1184-85. The court noted that privacy to the e-mail one sent diminished when
received because the recipient of the e-mail then could send it to others on the Internet. See id. at
1185.
70. See id. The defendant in Charbonneaualso raised a First Amendment claim which the
court rejected outright as meritless. See id. at 1184. In light of Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 117
S. Ct. 2329,2345,2351 (1997), material transmitted by Internet which is offensive but may not be
obscene, is protected under the First Amendment.
71. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
72. See Charbonneau,979 F. Supp. at 1184.
73. See id.at 1184-85.
74. 111 F.3d 1472 (10th Cir. 1997).
75. See id. at 1476.
76. See id.at 1475.
77. See id. at 1476.
78. See id.
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cause to justify a search of e-mail that was not connected to the crime
alleged to have occurred.79 Nevertheless, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that since the computer was an
instrumentality of the crime, everything within it was subject to a search."0
In discussing the legality of incidental seizure of e-mail, the court noted
"the obvious difficulties attendant in separating the contents of electronic
storage from the computer hardware during the course of a search." 8 '
The foregoing indicates that traditional Fourth Amendment analysis
provides little protection for communications in cyberspace. Although the
Fourth Amendment's protection is limited, federal wiretap law protects
against wrongful interception and access of computer messages.82 As the
discussion below indicates, the federal wiretap law is complicated and
counsel often err in the portion of the wiretap law they invoke or the
protection they believe the wiretap law provides. Therefore, it is critical for
practitioners to study carefully the federal wiretap statute and cases
interpreting it to determine what portion of the statute, if any, applies to
their case.
II.STATUTORY PROTECTION

Following Katz, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the federal wiretap statute).8 3 The
federal wiretap statute, in part, provided criminal and civil penalties for the
intentional, unauthorized interception or disclosure of a private
communication. 4 Congress intended the federal wiretap statute to codify
the reasonable expectation of privacy principle which the Court had
enunciated in Katz. 5
When Congress enacted the federal wiretap statute, it was concerned
with illegal wiretaps on telephones, the issue Katz had presented.8 6 As a
result, the federal wiretap statute only applied to "aural" interception and
did not contemplate digital communication. 7 As electronic communication
developed, Congress rectified the federal wiretap statute's limitation by

79. See id. at 1480.
80. See id
81. Id. The court compared the computer to a container used to store contraband. See id.
82. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1998).
83. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1998).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1998).
85. See Skatoff-Gee, supra note 18, at 197.
86. See Thomas R. Greenberg, E-Mail and Voice Mail: Employee Privacyand the Federal
Wiretap Statute, 44 Am.U.L. REV. 219, 227 (1994); Skatoff-Gee, supra note 18, at 193-94.
87. See Greenberg, supra note 86, at 227.
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enacting the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) in 1986." 8
The ECPA added communication by electronic means to those
communications the federal wiretap statute protected.8 9 In addition,
Congress enacted the "Stored Communications Act" 90 in 1986 to punish
the unauthorized, intentional access of information stored following its
electronic transmission.
A. Interception
Title I of the ECPA 9' addresses interception. An interception under the
statute requires receiving or recording the communication while it is being
transmitted. 92 As a result, retrieving communication already sent, such as
voice mail or pages, is not an interception. 93
Similarly, there is no interception if e-mail is retrieved after it reaches
its destination.94 In Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret
Service,95 the Secret Service seized a computer as part of an investigation
of an unauthorized distribution of Bell Company text files. 96 The seized
computer operated a bulletin board containing private subscriber e-mail

88. See Baum, supra note 8, at 1021-22. The ECPA and its predecessor, Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, contained exceptions to liability for
interception of communications. See Greenberg, supra note 86, at 235-36. Omnibus permitted
monitoring another call by extension telephone if done in the ordinary course of business and the
extension was provided by a communications carrier in the ordinary course of business. See id. at
235. How the "ordinary course of business" exception applied was disputed among the circuits. See
id. at 235 n.88. The ECPA altered the language of the exception to permit an interception by a
device which" 'a provider of wire or electronic communication service' "furnished in the ordinary
course of business "and used by [alsubscriber 'in the ordinary course of its business."' See id. at
236. Arguably, the language broadened the category of monitoring excluded from the statute
because any private employer network may contain a device provided by a wire or electronic
communications service provider in the ordinary course of business which the employer could use
in the ordinary course of business to monitor employee activity and efficiency. See id. However,
courts may distinguish using a communications device for business purposes and using it to spy.
See George v. Carusone, 849 F. Supp. 159, 164 (D. Conn. 1994) (holding, "If a person
surreptitiously records a telephone conversation, then the [ordinary course of business] exception
does not obtain").
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1998), as amended in 1986 by Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848,
commonly referred to as the "Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986."
90. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (1998).
91. See 1&U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1998).
92. See Payne v. Norwest Corp., 911 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (D. Mont. 1995).
93. See United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 836-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Payne, 911 F.
Supp. at 1303.
94. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir.
1994).
95. Id. at 457.
96. See id. at 458-59.
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that was unrelated to the offense originally investigated.97 After the Secret
Service read and deleted the private e-mail, the bulletin board provider
alleged the Secret Service violated Title I of the ECPA prohibiting the
unlawful interception of electronic communications.98 Because the Secret
Service did not access the e-mail contemporaneously with its transmission,
but accessed it after it reached its destination, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the Secret Service did not violate Title
I of the ECPA. 99
The ECPA is not a strict liability statute. Liability under the statute does
not exist unless the offender had intent (or knowledge if the violation was
disclosure)' and the offender intruded upon a reasonable expectation of
privacy.'°0 As a result, inadvertent access to e-mail is not an offense under
0 3 for example, the court refused
the statute."02 In Wesley College v. Pitts,"
to find a systems operator guilty of interception when he read e-mail
someone accidentally sent to his station for printing. " In another case, the
court held no liability existed where there was insufficient evidence to
prove the alleged offender acted "deliberately and purposefully."'0 5
Whether a privacy interest existed when the interception occurred
depends upon whether the sender had a reasonable expectation of
privacy.'" In Wesley v. WISN Division, 07 the court addressed interception
of verbal communications and held the reasonableness of a privacy
expectation depended upon the probability of interception.' 08 Therefore,
97. See id.at 459.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 461-62.
100. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2701 & 2702 (1998); United States v. Townsend, 987 F.2d 927,
930 (2d Cir. 1993).
101. See Payne v. Norwest Corp., 911 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (D. Mont. 1995); Skatoff-Gee,
supra note 18 at 201-03.
102. See Wesley College v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 384 (D. Del. 1997).
103. Id.
104. See id.
at 379,389-90. The court in Pitts also differentiated between the computer screen,
which it considered just a medium, and the wire by which a message is transmitted, to determine
that an interception could not occur unless information was tapped while moving across the wire.
See id.at 384. The court noted, "Simply put, Congress had in mind more surreptitious threats to
privacy than simply looking over one's shoulder at a computer screen when it passed the ECPA."
Id.
105. See Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1542 (D. Utah 1993) (following United
States v. Townsend, 987 F.2d 927, 930 (2d Cir. 1989)). In Thompson, the court also refused to find
guilt for disclosure of intercepted information where the plaintiff failed to prove the person who
disclosed the information knew or should have known the information had been obtained by illegal
wiretap. See id. at 1541.
106. See Wesley v. WISN Div., 806 F. Supp. 812, 814 (E.D. Wis. 1992)..
107. Id.
108. See id. Following the reasoning of Katz, the court held that if a person knew their
comments could be detected artificially with ease, then there is no reasonable expectation of
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employees who shielded their conversations from being overheard by
speaking in hushed tones could reasonably expect the conversations to
remain private and would receive privacy protection."9
This reasoning, when applied to computer communications, allows
technology to diminish privacy because it is reasonable to expect that
communications on a network may be intercepted by the network provider
and other network users in the absence of encryption or password
protection. Where an employer has the ability to access employee terminals
via a network, the employee does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy."' If, however, a court uses the reasoning of Charbonneau,that
communication sent over a network is akin to a letter being mailed, then
a reasonable expectation of privacy does attach to computer
communications en route to their destination. "' An interception also is not
a violation if there was consent, which may be implied." 2 Those who work
in places where recording communications is routine, such as a police
station, are deemed to have consented to interception." 3
B. Stored Communications
Title II of the ECPA" 4 addresses stored communications. "' Accessing
stored communications is not an interception and, therefore, does not
impose liability under Title I of the ECPA." 6 The protection Title II

privacy. See id. at 815. Some courts have rejected the theory that an expectation of privacy is based
on the ability to protect privacy. See Dunlap v. County of lnyo, 121 F.3d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1997)
(unpublished disposition). In Dunlap, the Ninth Circuit held that even where a police department
routinely recorded conversations over one of its telephone lines, the employee who used it could
have a reasonable expectation of privacy while using it. See id. The court stated, "The capability
of monitoring does not create implied consent to any monitoring that occurs. Cellular telephones
and electronic mail are both technologies of questionable privacy, but we nonetheless reasonably
expect privacy in our cell phone calls and e-mail messages." Id.
109. See Wesley, 806 F. Supp. at 814.
110. See United States v. Simons, 29 F. Supp. 2d 324, 327 (E.D. Va. 1998).
11I. See United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
112. See Payne v. Norwest Corp., 911 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (D. Mont. 1995); George v.
Carusone, 849 F. Supp. 159, 164 (D. Conn. 1994); Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535, 1543
(D. Utah 1993). 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) eliminates liability where there was consent if the
interception was not used in furtherance of illegal activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 251 ](2)(d) (1998).
113. See George, 849 F. Supp. at 164. But see Dunlap, 121 F.3d at 717 (holding that police
department employee did not consent to monitoring even though the department routinely
monitored communications over the telephone line the employee used).
114. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (1998).
115. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir.
1994). In Steve Jackson, the district court held, and the Secret Service did not challenge, that the
Secret Service violated Title II of the ECPA by reading and destroying the private e-mail the Secret
Service seized. See id.
116. See id. at 460.
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provides stored communications is different and narrower than the
protection Title I affords communications in transit.'17 First, mere
unauthorized access does not create liability." 8 Second, electronic
communications service providers are excluded from liability under Title
II unless a provider knowingly divulges the contents of a stored
communication in a manner not permitted.' 19
Title II permits electronic communications service providers to divulge
contents of a stored communication for a variety of reasons, including
divulging the communication to law enforcement authorities if the service
provider accidentally locates information which appears to pertain to
criminal activity. ' In addition, "contents" of an electronic communication,
as used in Title II, has a narrow meaning. In Jessup-Morgan v. America
Online, Inc., 21 the court held that "contents" consisted of the substance of
a communication and not user identification. ' At issue was AOL's
disclosure, pursuant to a subpoena, of a user's identification and profile.' 23
The court used an exception in Title II which allows a service provider to
disclose subscriber information "to any person other than a governmental24
entity," and held that the disclosure did not violate Title II of the ECPA.1
Unauthorized access of an electronic communications service facility
is a violation under Title II of the ECPA, but accessing an individual's
private communication is not.125 The narrow scope of Title II of the ECPA
prohibits only an electronic communications service provider from
disclosing contents of a communication. 26 It does not prohibit a private
party from disclosing the stored communications of another. 127 This

117. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra.note 86, at 248-49 (discussing the irrationality in the

difference between Title Iand Title II of the ECPA).
118. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1998) (imposing liability where someone intentionally gains
unauthorized access of a "facility through which an electronic communication service is provided
and thereby obtains, alters or prevents authorized access .....
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701(c), 2702 (1998).
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b), 2703 (1998).
20 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
See id at 1108.
See id.at 1107.
See id.at 1108; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (1998). 18 U.S.C. § 2703 contains requirements for

government access of electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (1998). Generally, a
warrant, court order, or grand jury or trial subpoena is required for government access. See id.
However, a service provider can divulge contents of a communication to law enforcement if the
provider notices illegal activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b). Also, the exceptions to the warrant
requirement applicable in warrantless searches under the Fourth Amendment apply under the
warrant requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2703. See United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818. 837
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1998).
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (1998).
127. See Wesley College v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 389 (1997), noting "a person who does

PRIVACY AND THE INTERNET

dichotomy has resulted in the leakage of information with potentially
harmful results. 128
In Anderson ConsultingLLP v. UOP,19 for example, adversary litigants
published e-mail belonging to Anderson Consulting without its consent in
the Wall Street Journal.30 The court held that the parties who published
the information, UOP and its lawyers, were not liable because they were
not electronic communications service providers within the meaning of
Title II of the ECPA and, therefore, were not barred from disclosing stored
communications.' 3' The disclosed e-mail had been stored on UOP's
network while Anderson was working on UOP's system. 132 The court held
that a company-wide network did not qualify as an electronic
communications service provider because it did not provide
communication services to the public at large. 133 As noted below, however,
the electronic communications service provider requirement of Title II of
the ECPA is open to interpretation.
C. ProviderExceptions
The ECPA does not define what an electronic communications service
provider is. 134 Coverage under both titles of the ECPA depends upon
whether the party who engaged in the proscribed action was an electronic
communications service provider. 35 Title I of the ECPA excludes from its
coverage prohibiting interception "an operator... or an officer, employee,
or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service...
while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition
of his service."' 136 Title II of the ECPA has a similar provision excluding
electronic communications service providers from its prohibition against
accessing stored communications, but allows anyone, except an electronic
37
communications service provider, to divulge stored communications. 1

not provide an electronic communication service.., can disclose or use with impunity the contents
of an electronic communication unlawfully obtained from electronic storage." Id.
128. See Anderson Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1042 (N.D. II. 1998); Sega
Enter. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 930-31 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that subsequent use
of stored e-mail obtained without authorization was permissible because it was obtained from
bulletin board that did not qualify as provider of electronic communications service to public).
129. 991 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. 111.1998).
130. See id. at 1042.
131. See id-at 1043.
132. See id. at 1042.
133. See id. at 1043.
134. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2), 2701-2710 (1998); see also Baum, supra note 8, at 1023-25
(discussing confusion regarding the provider exception).
135. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2), 2701-2710 (1998).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (1998).
137. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701(c), 2702 (1998).
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The lack of a definition of electronic communications service provider
and the importance of an offender's status as a service provider has
resulted in inconsistent interpretations.' s In Anderson Consulting, the
court held that a company's network had to be available to the public at
large in order for the company to be a service provider. 39 In Bohach v. City
ofReno, 40 the court did not consider public access to a network necessary
to qualify the network provider as an electronic communications service
provider under the ECPA.' 4 ' The variance in statutory interpretation, in
turn, has led to inconsistent holdings. In Anderson, the court applied a
definition of electronic communications service provider which enabled a
network provider to leak information under Title II by defining provider so
narrowly that the network provider did not come under the ECPA's
prohibition against providers divulging contents of stored information.142
In Bohach, however, the court defined electronic communications service
provider so broadly (anyone who provides personnel with the ability to
send or receive electronic communications) that a police department was
held to be a provider and, as a result, was not liable for accessing the stored
communications of its employees.'43
The manipulation of definitions and statutory provisions can reduce
privacy for employees. If a court deems an employer who supplies the
means of electronic communication to be a provider, then that employer
can access its employees' stored messages and use them in subsequent
actions against an employee. '4In UnitedStatesv. Mullins,' the court held
American Airlines was an electronic communications service provider and
did not act unlawfully when it monitored activity over the SABRE
network.' 46 The court held this was the case even though American
Airlines did not own SABRE, but simply provided its agents access to the
SABRE system which other airlines also used.' 47 The court's purpose in
138. CompareAnderson Consulting, 991 F. Supp. at 1043, with Bohach v. City of Reno, 932
F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996).
139. See Anderson Consulting, 991 F. Supp. at 1043.
140. 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996).
141. See id. at 1236. The court held the computer network which the city provided its
employees made the city a provider within the meaning of the statute because the "terminals,
computer and software, and the pagers it issues to its personnel, are, after all, what provide those
users with 'the ability to send or receive' electronic communications." Id
142. See Anderson Consulting, 991 F. Supp. at 1043.
143. See Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1236.
144. See id. at 1236.
145. 992 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2997 (1993).
146. See id. at 1478. A SABRE network is an airline's computerized reservation system. See
id. at 1474. Airline agents log onto a SABRE network by password and identification codes and
then can obtain flight information and make or alter reservations through the use of Passenger Name
Records (PNRs). See id
147. See id at 1478.
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defining American Airlines as an electronic communications service
provider was to uphold American's actions in locating and prosecuting
14
illegal activity which the defendants had conducted by using SABRE.
Together, Anderson, Bohach, and Mullins reveal the failure of federal
law to provide consistent electronic privacy protection. Whether an entity
is a provider within the meaning of the ECPA depends upon what
definition of electronic communications service provider a court uses.
Until the ECPA is amended to define electronic communications service
provider, the outcome of cases will vary from court to court.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS

Statutory amendment is needed to clarify the meaning of an electronic
communications service provider and to clarify when computer
communications are subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Reliance on the ECPA, as currently enacted, leads to inconsistent results.
Reliance on the Fourth Amendment lacks certainty. Although the Fourth
Amendment has succeeded in permitting changes in privacy rights as those
changes have been needed for social advancement, the Fourth Amendment
runs the risk of becoming subordinate to technology if courts continue to
hold no privacy exists where technology makes privacy difficult to
maintain.
A. Encryption
To avoid such an outcome and provide some stability, members of
Congress have begun drafting legislation. ' One proposed bill, the Security
and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act, seeks to amend Title 18 of
the United States Code to permit encryption for lawful use. 0
Cryptography already has been successful in protecting confidential
consumer transactions and government activity.' 5 ' It promises to provide
the same protection to individuals without sacrificing the government's
ability to locate and punish those engaged in illegal computer activity.
148. See id. The defendants stole frequent flyer miles that were noted as available on SABRE
in order to obtain free tickets which they then sold, reaping a profit of over $1 million. See id. at
1474-75.
149. See Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act, H.R. 850, 106th Cong. (1999)
reprinted in <http://www.cdt.org/legislation/106th/encryption/safe.html> (visited Aug. 15, 1999);
Staff Discussion Draft of the Online Privacy Protection Act of 1999 ( visited Mar. 19, 1999)
<http://www.senate.gov/-bums/private.htm>; 139 CONG. REC. E2102 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1993) and
E1077 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1993) (statements of Rep. Williams).
150. See H.R. 850.
15 1. See Berryessa, supra note 3, at 66.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. I I

In April 1999, the Senate incorporated SAFE into a larger proposed
bill, known as the Electronic Rights for the 2 1st Century Act. 5 2 This bill,
like SAFE, would permit the use, sale and purchase of encryption code.' 53
In addition, it would tighten warrant requirements for computer wiretaps
and require notification to the party
whose communications would be
54
monitored pursuant to a warrant.

The push in Congress to formulate and pass amendments to Title 18
which would permit encryption reflects a growing consensus that
technology should cure the privacy problems which technology created by
use of cryptography.' 55 The utility of encryption is that it 1) indicates that
the person who knowingly communicates by encrypted code has a
subjective expectation of privacy; and 2) renders that expectation of
privacy reasonable since anyone who accesses the communication must
decode it to understand it.' 56 Despite its utility, however, the United States
government has sought to control the extent to which encryption code may
be used, particularly where it could be used to hide the secrets of foreign
governments. '57

In Bernstein v. UnitedStates DepartmentofState'5 8 and Karnv. United
States Department of State,'59 district courts considered challenges to
executive branch controls on the export of encryption code. The Bernstein
court held that encryption code is speech protected under the First
Amendment. 6 ' As a result, the court held the government could not
152. See 145 CONG. REC. $4041-$4044 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
153. See 145 CONG. REC. S4044-$4045 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
The proposed legislation would also permit forced decryption pursuant to a warrant during a
criminal investigation. See id.
154. See 145 CONG. REC. $4043-$4045 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
The proposed legislation permitting encryption would allow decryption of communications
pursuant to a warrant. See id at $4044-S4045.
155. See Wayne Madsen et al., Cryptography and Liberty: An International Survey of
EncryptionPolicy, 16 J. MARSHAL J.COMPUTER & INFo. L. 475,479 (1998) (discussing the Global
Internet Liberty Campaign to protect on-line rights by encrypting communication). A survey of
seventy-six countries showed the majority of countries do not regulate cryptography. See id. at 482.
In addition, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Union
are relaxing controls of cryptography to enhance commercial encryption technology development.
See id. at 482-83.
156. See Berryessa, supra note 3, at 63. Encryption disguises a message by using an algorithm
to translate a computer's code into meaninglessness. See id. Depending upon whether the
encryption system uses a "public key" or "private key," the encryption code may be deciphered by
the public or just the users. See id at 64 (providing a detailed explanation of encryption
technology).
157. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1292-93 (N.D. Cal.
1997).
158. See id. at 1291-96.
159. See 925 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1996).
160. See Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1306. Following the breadth of First Amendment
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prohibit the commercial use of encryption code because such a prohibition
would be a prior restraint on speech in violation of the First Amendment.' 6
Conversely, the Karn court held regulation of encryption code was a
constitutionally permissible method of protecting national security.' 62 It
held the regulations at issue were not based on the content of the code, but
security concerns, and therefore did not implicate the First Amendment.'63
The only appellate case addressing the issue to date is a decision from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which affirmed
Bernstein and stated in dicta that there may be a Fourth Amendment right
to encrypt communications.'" A few months after the Ninth Circuit issued
its opinion, however, it withdrew the same opinion and ordered that the
case be reheard' 65
Legislation proposed by Congress pertaining to encryption does not
prohibit executive branch control over the use of encryption technology
involving foreigners. 66 It does not set boundaries on the government's
ability to control use of encryption where the government claims national
security may be at stake. The proposed legislation also fails to resolve
ambiguities in current provisions of Title 18, like the electronic
communications service provider exception. The most serious drawback
of the proposed legislation is its failure to address warrantless searches.
Congress has not attempted to define public and private boundaries of
computer transmissions which could assist courts in determining whether
a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Instead, Congress has
proposed legislation that would increase the facilities which could disclose
information, 67 and looked to the use of warrants and encryption to protect

protection the Supreme Court granted to Internet communications in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997), the Bernstein court stated, "not only is the distinction between print and electronic media
increasingly untenable, but ... the Internet is subject to the same exacting level of First Amendment
scrutiny as print media." Id. at 1306-07.
161. See id. at 1306.
162. See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10; see also Junger v. Daley, 8 F.Supp.2d 708 (E.D. Ohio
1998) (holding encryption code, although sometimes expressive, does not deserve protection under
the First Amendment).
163. See id. The regulations at issue in Karn and Bernstein included the Arms Export Control
Act (22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796d) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 C.F.R. §§
120-30). See Bernstein, 974 F. Supp. at 1291; Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 3.
164. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 176 F.3d 1132, 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999).
165. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).
166. See 145 CONG. REC. S4044 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy). The
proposed legislation permits "any person within the United States, and for any any United States
person in a foreign country" to use encryption, but does not seek to prohibit control over the
exportation of encryption code. Id.
167. See id. (proposing a new provision in 18 U.S.C. § 2703 permitting a "domain name
registration service" to disclose customer or subscriber records),
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users against surveillance.168 Congressional efforts to address warrantless
searches have failed to produce any drafted legislation,'69 and legislation
currently under consideration does not even create any presumption of
privacy where encryption or passwords are used.
The executive branch, in turn, has requested Congress consider its
version of a cyberspace bill entitled, The Cyberspace Electronic Security
Act of 1999 (CESA).170 CESA, while acknowledging the importance of
encryption for privacy, is concerned primarily with decrypting
communications related to criminal activity.' 7 ' CESA would permit law
enforcement officers to decrypt data or communications without a warrant,
as long as the officers could obtain a warrant within forty-eight hours of
decryption, thereby reducing privacy in cyberspace. 72 Because Congress
has not agreed upon what rules should govern encryption, courts will have
to decide whether encryption is a legally permissible manifestation of an
expectation of privacy or a legitimate way to protect an existing right to
privacy.
B. Passwords
Password protection is another method by which technology can solve
the privacy problems which technology created. An attempt to prevent
access to computer records or communications by password protection
may create a presumption that the user had a reasonable expectation of
privacy, but courts have not been consistent in their treatment of attempts
to protect privacy."' In Sega1771
Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 74 the court
rejected the contention that a bulletin board's password requirement76
175
protected it from unauthorized access. In United States v. Maxwell,'

168. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S4043 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1999) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(proposing government access to electronic communication by warrant or subpoena).
169. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. S8236 (daily ed. July 15, 1998) (statements of Sen. Lott, et al.);
139 CONG. REC. S6122 (daily ed. May 19, 1993) (statement of Sen. Simon); 139 CONG. REC.
E1077 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1993) (statement of Rep. Williams) (discussing the need to pass a
"Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act" which would ban hidden monitoring).
170. See President's Message to the Congress Transmitting the Proposed "Cyberspace
Electronic Security Act of 1999," 35 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. DoC. 1760 (Sept. 16, 1999).
171. See
Cyberspace.
Electronic
Security
Act
of
1999,
reprinted in
<http://www.cdt.org/crypto/CESA/CESArevised.shtml> (visited Sept. 24, 1999).

172. See

Cyberspace

Electronic

Security

Act

of

1999,

reprinted in

<http://www.cdt.org/crypto/CESA/CESArevised.shtml> (visited Sept. 24, 1999).
173. Compare Sega Enter. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 930 (N.D. Cal. 1996), with
United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
174. 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
175. See Sega, 948 F. Supp. at 930. "There is no evidence that the intent of requiring
passwords is to protect the system from use by those other than the original user .... Id.
176. 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
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however, the court found use of an alias indicated the user had a reasonable
expectation of privacy."77 A statute which recognizes an attempt to keep
communications or data private (by the use of passwords, aliases or
encryption) as a manifestation of an expectation of privacy; while
punishing those who conceal illegal activity, would enable courts to punish
intrusive surveillance without sacrificing law enforcement objectives.
Currently, neither Fourth Amendment principles nor federal statutes
provide protection that is comprehensive or consistent. Comprehensiveness
and consistency can be achieved through statutes that define computer
users' rights, the limitations of those rights, and remedies for the wrongful
access or use of computer communications. Given the increasing reliance
upon computers and the increasing ability to access computers, it is
imperative that a coherent set of rules regarding access to and use of
private computer records and transmissions be developed. Without a
coherent set of rules, unrestrained intrusion into private computer records
or communications will continue to cause litigious and harmful results for
unwary computer users. These unfortunate results could lead computer
users to distrust the utility of computers to store or transmit private
information.

177. See Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 417.

